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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
BECKER, Chief Judge. 
 
W.R. Huff Asset Management Co., L.L.C. ("Huff "), and 
HSBC Bank USA ("HSBC") appeal from the order of the 
District Court confirming a reorganization plan for Bruno's, 
Inc., (Bruno's), and several affiliates.1 Bruno's is based in 
Alabama and operates a chain of supermarkets in the 
southeastern United States. Huff was the holder of $290 
million in Bruno's subordinated notes; HSBC was the 
indenture trustee for the subordinated notes (we refer to 
them together as Huff). They argue that the District Court 
should not have confirmed the plan for a host of reasons, 
most notably because it contains releases that violate the 
absolute priority rule of 11 U.S.C. S 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) and are 
thus impermissible under the Bankruptcy Code. 
 
Three separate interests have appeared to defend the 
plan: the debtors and debtors-in-possession (referred to 
throughout as the Debtors); the Chase Manhattan Bank, 
representing the group of banks (the Banks) that were the 
senior lenders to Bruno's before the reorganization; and the 
Official Unsecured Creditors' Committee. Together they 
contend that the plan does not violate the absolute priority 
rule because the releases were not granted "on account of " 
the interests of the released parties, but rather the claims 
released had little or no value. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The affiliates are PWS Holding Corp., Food Max of Mississippi, Inc, 
A.F. Stores, Inc., BR Air, Inc., Food Max of Georgia, Inc., Food Max of 
Tennessee, Inc., FoodMax, Inc., Lakeshore Foods, Inc., Bruno's 
Foodstores, Inc., Georgia Sales Co., and SSS Enterprises, Inc. 
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The absolute priority rule, found in 11 U.S.C. 
S 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii), provides that "the holder of any claim or 
interest that is junior to the claims of [a class of unsecured 
claims] will not receive or retain under the plan on account 
of such junior claim or interest any property." In Bank of 
America National Trust and Savings Association v. 203 
North LaSalle Street Partnership, 526 U.S. 434 (1999), the 
Supreme Court interpreted the "on account of " language in 
S (b)(2)(ii). The Court rejected arguments that "on account 
of " means "in satisfaction of " the interest or "in exchange 
for" the interest and concluded that it means"because of " 
the interest. Id. at 450-51. Accordingly, a causal connection 
between holding the prior claim or interest, and receiving or 
retaining property, will trigger the absolute priority rule. 
Huff submits that this plan, by releasing claims held by the 
bankrupt entity that arose out of the leveraged 
recapitalization, essentially transferred property to holders 
of junior equity in violation of the absolute priority rule. 
Huff argues that the release was a transfer to junior equity 
because the potential claims included claims against junior 
equity--affiliates of Kohlberg, Kravis, Roberts & Co., L.L.C. 
(KKR), and other participants in the recapitalization. Huff 
contends that the transfer violated the absolute priority 
rule because senior creditors (including Huff) had not been 
paid in full. 
 
We conclude that the District Court did not err in the 
challenged respects.2 The Examiner appointed by the 
District Court under 11 U.S.C. SS 1104(c) and 105(a) at the 
behest of Huff found in a comprehensive report that the 
claims released had little potential merit. We find no error 
in the District Court's decision to accept the Examiner's 
findings and legal conclusions regarding the viability of the 
claims, and we reject Huff 's contention that the releases 
were granted "on account of " old equity's interest. We also 
reject the Debtors' contention that the challenge to 
confirmation is equitably moot under In re Continental 
Airlines, 91 F.3d 553, 559 (3d Cir. 1996) (en banc). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Because the order of reference to the Bankruptcy Court was 
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Huff 's other challenges to confirmation include that the 
plan should not have been confirmed because the District 
Court erred in determining that it was proposed in good 
faith as required by 11 U.S.C. S1129(a)(3). Huff has not 
offered anything but innuendo to support its contention 
that the Debtors violated this portion of the Code, and we 
find no error in the District Court's conclusion that the 
plan was proposed in good faith. 
 
Additionally, Huff contends that the plan should not have 
been confirmed because it violates the following sections of 
the Bankruptcy Code: 11 U.S.C. S 510(a), which provides 
that a "subordination agreement is enforceable in a case 
under this title to the same extent that such agreement is 
enforceable under applicable nonbankruptcy law;" 11 
U.S.C. S 524(e), which provides that "[e]xcept as provided in 
subsection (a)(3) of this section, discharge of a debt of the 
debtor does not affect the liability of any other entity on, or 
the property of any other entity for, such debt;" 11 U.S.C. 
S 363, which governs the sale of assets outside of the 
reorganization plan; 11 U.S.C. S 1129(a)(2), which provides 
that a court shall confirm a plan only if "[t]he proponent of 
the plan complies with the applicable provisions of this 
Title;" and 11 U.S.C. S 1129(a)(7), which provides that a 
court shall confirm a plan only if the debtor demonstrated 
at the Confirmation Hearing that creditors rejecting the 
plan would not receive a greater recovery in a Chapter 7 
liquidation. 
 
We reject Huff 's argument under S 510(a) because the 
subordinated noteholders' rights under the agreement do 
not arise until the senior indebtedness is paid in full, which 
has not happened under the plan. We reject the S 524(e) 
argument because we conclude that the limited release in 
Paragraph 58 of the plan does not come within the meaning 
of S 524(e) and is consistent with the standard of liability 
under the Code. We reject Huff 's S 363 argument because 
we do not agree with the contention that the Plan triggered 
a duty to fully market the company. We conclude that Huff 
does not have standing to raise the challenge under 
S 1129(a)(2) because third-party standing is limited on 
appeal in bankruptcy cases and Huff cannot show that it 
was personally aggrieved by any alleged failure of 
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disclosure. Finally, because we are satisfied that the 
Debtors met the S 1129(a)(7) burden of demonstrating that 
the creditors would not receive a greater recovery under 
Chapter 7, we reject the challenge under this section as 
well. We will therefore affirm the order of the District Court 
confirming the plan. 
 
I. Factual & Procedural Background 
 
As of the commencement date of the Chapter 11 cases, 
Bruno's was a chain of about 200 supermarkets operating 
in the southeastern United States (principally in Alabama). 
In 1995, affiliates of KKR acquired an 83.33% interest in 
Bruno's in a leveraged recapitalization. As part of this 
transaction, then existing shareholders of Bruno's were 
bought out for approximately $880 million. The leveraged 
recapitalization was financed by a revolving credit and term 
loan facility provided by the Banks, an equity contribution 
of $250 million by KKR through Crimson Associates LLP, 
and the issuance by Bruno's of $400 million in notes due 
in 2005 pursuant to an indenture. Section 9 of the 
indenture contains a subordination clause that provides 
that the noteholders' claims are fully subordinated to the 
payment in full (including interest) of the claims of the 
senior lenders (the Banks). 
 
For at least two years following the leveraged 
recapitalization, Bruno's paid all of its debts as they 
matured (including $97.5 million in interest payments on 
the subordinated notes). In the summer of 1997, the 
Debtors were able to refinance the Bank debt relating to the 
recapitalization at a lower interest rate and on terms more 
favorable than the original terms. But by the second half of 
1997, as a result of either mismanagement by the directors 
selected by KKR and a controversial change in pricing 
policy (according to Huff), or as a result of a greatly 
increased level of competition in the market (according to 
the Debtors), Bruno's began to falter. Bruno's had difficulty 
in meeting payment obligations from the recapitalization 
and in paying its suppliers and other creditors. On 
February 2, 1998, it filed a voluntary petition for relief 
under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. Since thefiling 
date, the Debtors have remained in possession. 
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As of the filing date, Bruno's owed approximately $462 
million to the Banks, $135 million to trade vendors, 
suppliers, and other unsecured creditors, and $421 million 
on the subordinated notes. In the 90 days prior tofiling for 
relief, it made payments to a variety of creditors and 
suppliers amounting to more than $600 million, including 
to firms that provided professional services to the Debtors.3 
However, the only preference action the Debtors pursued 
was an action against the Banks seeking to avoid liens 
granted to the prepetition lenders in December 1997. 
 
In February 1998, the Bankruptcy Trustee appointed a 
nine member "Official Unsecured Creditor's Committee" (the 
Committee). Huff, holder of $290 million in subordinated 
notes, was the largest creditor of the estate and was elected 
co-chair of the Committee. The other members of the 
Committee included four representatives of the Banks, 
three representatives from the trade, and one representative 
of the other subordinated noteholders. A representative 
from the United Food and Commercial Workers Union, 
which represented supermarket employees of Bruno's, was 
appointed to serve on the Committee from March 1998 to 
April 1999. 
 
In October 1998, the Debtors presented a business plan 
to the Committee. The Committee rejected this plan and 
then appointed a subcommittee, the "Strategic Alternatives 
Committee," to work with the Debtors to develop a new 
plan. This Subcommittee conducted a test marketing of the 
enterprise and sent out a summary information package to 
two different sets of potential buyers (neither of which 
included financial buyers). The Subcommittee did not 
believe that there would be interest in purchasing the 
enterprise, and indeed none of the companies contacted 
expressed an interest. By January 1999, the Debtors 




3. For example, payments to suppliers included approximately $19 
million to Kraft Foods, $4.1 million to Frito-Lay, and $750,000 to 
Pillsbury. Payments to providers of professional services included 
$225,551.69 to Cravath, Swaine & Moore, $1.2 million to KKR, and 
$232,838.71 to Wasserstein Perella & Co. 
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Throughout the spring of 1999, the Committee and 
subgroups of the Committee convened several times to 
develop a reorganization plan. Huff asserts that it was 
excluded from these meetings and that many of the 
conferees pursued some interest other than maximizing the 
size of the bankruptcy estate. In March 1999, the Debtors' 
law firm determined that legal claims arising out of the 
leveraged recapitalization (primarily fraudulent transfer 
claims) were not worth pursuing because they believed that 
the claims were unlikely to succeed and that litigation 
would be expensive, time consuming, complicated, 
protracted and vigorously defended, and likely would delay 
the confirmation of the reorganization plan. In April 1999, 
the Committee voted to deny funds to pursue the claims, 
while preserving the claims for further consideration. In 
response, Huff successfully moved for the appointment of 
an independent examiner to evaluate the claims. The 
Debtors presented the first version of the new plan in May 
1999. It was revised several times between May and 
December 1999. 
 
As a part of the negotiations regarding reorganization, 
three independent entities (Wasserstein Perella & Co. (for 
the Debtors), PricewaterhouseCoopers (for the Committee), 
and Chilimark Partners (for the Banks)) conducted 
assessments of the Debtors and reported current value 
estimations ranging between $260 and $315 million. Huff 's 
expert argued for a valuation at $580 million, but this 
valuation was rejected by the District Court, and Huff 
appears to have abandoned any argument for it on appeal. 
HSBC still appears to contend that the reorganized 
enterprise was "significantly undervalued by the Debtors 
and the Bank Group." HSBC does not, however, argue that 
the District Court committed clear error in determining that 
the reorganization value of the Debtors was "substantially 
below the amount necessary to allow for the satisfaction in 
full of the Bank claims" and thus that Huff and the other 
holders of subordinated notes were substantially out of the 
money (by about $300 million). The interests of the holders 
of the subordinated notes, including Huff and HSBC, were 
thus wiped out and, by operation of the Code, 11 U.S.C. 
S 1126(g), the holders are deemed to have rejected the plan. 
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Huff and HSBC challenge three separate releases of legal 
claims included in the plan. We describe the different 




The first releases pertain to the estate's claims arising 
out of the leveraged recapitalization. These releases include 
"avoidance claims" that, if successful, could have allowed 
the Debtors to avoid certain aspects of the 1995 leveraged 
recapitalization. In late 1998, the Debtors, with the consent 
of the Committee, undertook a review of the leveraged 
recapitalization to determine if any viable fraudulent 
transfer claims existed and should be pursued. In March 
1999, the Debtors' counsel Weil, Gotshal & Manges 
completed a 100 page report analyzing the claims, 
concluding that the transaction was not a fraudulent 
transfer and that there were no viable claims against any of 
its participants. In April 1999, the Committee nevertheless 
voted to preserve these causes of action in the plan. One 
month later, however, the Committee reversed its position 
and, with the support of the trade representatives and the 
Banks, voted to support the plan releasing the claims. 
 
Huff and HSBC objected to these releases and, as noted, 
successfully moved the District Court for the appointment 
of an Examiner to evaluate the claims. The District Court 
appointed Harrison J. Goldin as Examiner. The Examiner's 
Final Report, prepared with the aid of eminent counsel, 
made extensive findings of fact regarding the leveraged 
recapitalization.4 The Examiner adopted a model for 
assessing the viability of the claims that broke the 
probability of success into five categories. Under the model, 
the Examiner concluded that a claim was "highly likely" to 
succeed if he believed that it had an 80% or greater chance 
of success; "likely" if the Examiner believed that it had a 
60% to 80% chance of success; "reasonable" if the 
Examiner believed that the likelihood of success was 
between 40% and 60%; "unlikely" if the Examiner believed 
its chance of success was only between 20% and 40%; and 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. The Examiner interviewed 19 people and reviewed approximately 
75,000 pages of documents relating to the transaction. 
 
                                10 
  
"remote" if the Examiner concluded that there was less 
than a 20% chance of success. 
 
As the report details, in August 1995, certain affiliates of 
KKR, including an Alabama corporation formed for the 
transaction, Crimson Associates LLP (of which KKR is the 
general partner), acquired 83.33% of the stock of Bruno's. 
To pay for this transaction, Bruno's and its affiliated 
Debtors obtained cash and credit through the issuance of 
$400 million in notes, a $475 million term loan facility from 
Chemical Bank, and a $125 million revolving credit facility 
from Chemical Bank (from which approximately $10 million 
was drawn to fund the 1995 transaction). KKR and its 
affiliates contributed $250 million, and Bruno's applied $20 
million of its existing cash to the transaction. 
 
The net cash proceeds were allocated to the following 
principal uses: (1) payment of $880.1 million of cash 
merger consideration to the pre-closing shareholders (the 
purchase of Bruno's pre-transaction outstanding common 
stock at $12.00 per share); (2) repayment of $200 million 
plus accrued interest in pre-transaction indebtedness; and 
(3) payment of approximately $40 million in fees and 
expenses related to the merger.5 The Examiner hired Goldin 
Associates, L.L.C., to perform a detailed financial analysis 
of the recapitalization. The analysis covered two principal 
issues regarding Bruno's at the time of the recapitalization: 
the solvency of Bruno's, and the adequacy of Bruno's' 
capital resources to meet its future needs, including its 
ability to pay its debts and satisfy its liabilities as due. 
These issues are important to analyzing the claims arising 
out of the recapitalization because the viability of the 
claims depends on whether the recapitalization left Bruno's 
insolvent or with an unreasonably small amount of assets 
in relation to the business or the transaction. If the value 
of the assets acquired in the recapitalization does not 
exceed the debt incurred, or if the business was left with 
unreasonably small capital, the transaction may be a 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. These fees and expenses included $15 million in fees to KKR, more 
than $14 million to Chase, and more than $10 million to BT Securities 
for underwriting fees and intrabank funding costs. 
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"fraudulent transfer." Transactions in violation of the 
prohibition on fraudulent transfers can be avoided. 6 
 
The test of solvency is whether, at the time of the 
recapitalization, the company's assets exceeded its 
liabilities. There are two basic approaches to this 
evaluation: asset by asset evaluation, which ascribes value 
to each asset and determines solvency by comparing the 
sum of those assets to total liabilities, and enterprise 
valuation, which values the business as a going concern 
and includes intangibles such as relationships with 
customers and suppliers, and the name, profile, and 
reputation of the business.7 The Examiner concluded that 
it was likely (i.e., that there was a 60-80% chance) that a 
court would apply the business enterprise analysis. The 
Examiner believed that the business enterprise evaluation 
was the appropriate measure of solvency because KKR 
acquired Bruno's as a going concern. 
 
Under the business enterprise evaluation, the Examiner 
performed three separate analyses: a comparable public 
company analysis, a comparable acquisitions analysis, and 
a discounted cash flow analysis. The Examiner found that 
in all but one of the relevant formulations, Bruno's was 
solvent at the time of the recapitalization. The approach 
favored by the Examiner, comparing enterprise value 
derived from a discounted cash flow analysis to long-term 
debt, reflected that the enterprise value of Bruno's exceeded 
its long-term debt by approximately $270 million to $690 
million. The valuation is a range because the Examiner 
used three earnings amounts: sales, EBITDA (earnings 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. Fraudulent transfer actions may be brought by a debtor-in-possession 
under S 548 of the Code, see 11 U.S.C.S 548, and, pursuant to S 544(b) 
of the Code, under applicable state fraudulent transfer statutes, see 11 
U.S.C. S 544(b). Because the recapitalization occurred approximately two 
and one-half years before the commencement of the Chapter 11 cases, 
S 548 is inapplicable, and hence any fraudulent transfer claims would 
have to be brought under state law through S 544(b) of the Code. 
 
7. In assessing liabilities, the Examiner considered the bank loans, 
subordinated notes, capital lease obligations, deferred tax liability, and 
contingent and other off-balance sheet liabilities. The Examiner 
concluded that no material adjustments to the balance sheet liabilities 
were required for purposes of the solvency analysis. 
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before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization), and 
EBIT (earnings before interest and taxes). The trading 
market enterprise value is divided by these earning 
amounts to derive multiples, which are applied to Bruno's' 
earnings totals to derive valuation. 
 
The other methods of analyzing solvency also resulted in 
a range because the Examiner considered multiple earnings 
amounts. The "assets to liabilities" construct, comparing 
total adjusted enterprise value derived from a discounted 
cash flow analysis to total liabilities, showed that Bruno's 
was solvent by approximately $215 to $635 million. The 
acquisition multiples test, which gives greater weight to an 
acquisition premium, also indicated that Bruno's was 
solvent, with assets of approximately $188 million to $250 
million, using multiples of EBITDA and EBIT, respectively 
(and higher if the multiple of sales is applied). 8 The market 
multiples solvency test, which does not include a control 
premium, produced lower margins of solvency ranging from 
approximately $27 to $104 million. The only test which 
indicated insolvency applied a southeast sales multiple. 
Under this test, the Examiner considered the sales earnings 
amount for comparable enterprises operating in the 
southeastern United States only. 
 
The Examiner concluded that the southeast sales test 
was an inappropriate means of measuring the solvency of 
Bruno's and, in any event, should be given less weight than 
the other valuations standards. The Examiner also noted 
that the purchase price itself was probative of Bruno's' 
value (and thus solvency). The purchase price indicated an 
enterprise value of $1.2 billion, which exceeded long-term 
debt by approximately $245 million. Adding current 
liabilities of $156.4 million, the sum exceeded total 
liabilities by about $90 million.9 Although he deemed it 
unlikely that a court would apply the asset-by-asset test, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. The Examiner considered the sales multiple to be a less appropriate 
measure of solvency than EBITDA and EBIT. 
 
9. The Examiner's Report appears to contain an arithmetical or 
typographical error in that it concludes from the above numbers that the 
sum exceeded total liabilities by over $190 million, rather than $90 
million. Nothing in this case turns on this point, however. 
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the Examiner also conducted an analysis under the asset- 
by-asset methodology. The sum of Bruno's assets, valued 
piecemeal, was $1,024.8 million. The assets did not exceed 
the total of liabilities, which were $1,114.1 million. 
 
Additionally, the Examiner analyzed whether the 
recapitalization left Bruno's with unreasonably small 
capital. The critical question is whether the parties' 
projections were reasonable at the time of the transaction. 
The analysis looked at historical data, such as cashflow, 
net sales, gross profit margins, and net profits and losses, 
and whether the parties considered difficulties that might 
arise, such as interest rates fluctuations and market 
downturns, to gauge the reasonableness of the projections 
in light of working capital needs in the industry and actual 
cash available to service needs. Actual performance of the 
debtor following the transaction is evidence of whether the 
parties' projections were reasonable. 
 
The Examiner opined that Bruno's was not 
undercapitalized. He concluded that at the time of the 
recapitalization Bruno's was a viable enterprise capable of 
substantial improvement, and that the parties' projections, 
although aggressive in some areas, were conservative in 
others. The enterprise failed, in his opinion, not because of 
inadequate capital, but because a series of unfortunate 
decisions, including a change in pricing strategy and a 
decision to close one distribution center, caused substantial 
erosion in the company's customer base. Declining demand 
for Bruno's' services resulted in declining revenue, which 
led to the bankruptcy. 
 
In part because of these conclusions, the Examiner 
opined that any claims arising out of the recapitalization 
were unlikely to succeed (i.e., that they had only a 20-40% 
chance of success). He reasoned that "the Recapitalization 
differed fundamentally from prior-leveraged transactions 
that have been found to be unlawful; among other things, 
the risks of the transaction were borne by the acquirer 
(KKR) and the lenders (who were unsecured), rather than 
shifted onto pre-transaction creditors." The Examiner also 
concluded that the claims were "not promising," were 
"limited and speculative," that "significant defenses" were 
available to each of the principal participants, the former 
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shareholders, the Banks, the subordinated noteholders, 
and KKR in the recapitalization, and that 
 
       [i]n light of the multiple legal and factual obstacles to 
       any substantial fraudulent transfer or illegal 
       distribution recovery by the Debtors [relating to the 
       recapitalization], the examiner believes that the 
       prosecution of such claims is extremely difficult to 
       justify . . . . As a legal matter, the laws of the governing 
       jurisdiction (Alabama, and, if suit is filed in Delaware, 
       the Third Circuit) present formidable obstacles to 
       recovery from the principal defendants. 
 
The releases of these claims do not cover any direct, 
personal, non-derivative claims held by creditors against 
non-debtor third parties. The releases do extinguish many 
if not all of the claims arising out of the recapitalization 
that could have been pursued by the Debtors or on their 
behalf. The parties do not dispute the findings of fact 
included in the Examiner's Final Report. Huff and HSBC 
argue, however, that the Examiner's (and the District 
Court's) conclusion that there was little value to be had 
from the claims was flawed because it depended on the 
Examiner's conclusion that Bruno's was left solvent after 
the recapitalization. Huff argues that the Examiner erred in 




The second issue regarding the releases has to do with 
Paragraph 58 of the Confirmation order, which releases 
Committee members and professionals who provided 
services after the petition date from certain liability for their 
work in the reorganization. The release in Paragraph 58 is 
limited to claims brought in connection with work on the 
bankruptcy reorganization plan, and it does not eliminate 
liability but rather limits it to willful misconduct or gross 
negligence. Huff and HSBC nevertheless argue that this 
release violates S 524(e) of the Bankruptcy Code because it 
affects the liability of another entity for the debt of the 
Debtors. The Debtors respond that the releases do not 
come within the meaning of S 524(e) and were consistent 
with the standard of liability under the Code. 
 




The third set of claims concern the waiver of preferences, 
i.e., preference claims to recover from trade creditors and 
suppliers for payments made in the 90 days prior tofiling 
for bankruptcy. As noted above, the Debtors paid out 
substantial sums of money during this period. Under 
bankruptcy law, such payments can be recovered by the 
estate; S 547 of the Bankruptcy Code vests exclusive 
discretion to prosecute or not prosecute preference claims 
with the trustee or debtor-in-possession. Afterfiling, the 
Debtors pursued a preference action against the Banks, 
seeking to avoid certain liens granted to the Banks within 
90 days of the filing. The action settled; the Banks agreed 
to release the liens granted just prior to the bankruptcy 
filing against property and assets of the Debtors and, in 
exchange, the Debtors agreed to pay the fees and expenses 
of the Banks' attorneys throughout the Chapter 11 case. 
The Debtors waived many other preference actions. The 
Debtors represent that they decided to waive these claims 
as a part of the reorganization plan in order to facilitate 





The District Court confirmed the Debtors' reorganization 
plan after a three day hearing. The confirmation order was 
issued by the District Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C.S 1334, 
which grants jurisdiction to the district courts over 
bankruptcy matters. Because this is an appeal from a 
district court exercising original jurisdiction in bankruptcy, 
our jurisdiction stems from 28 U.S.C. S 1291 rather than 
28 U.S.C. S 158(d). See In re Marvel Entertainment Group, 
Inc., 140 F.3d 463, 470 (3d Cir. 1998). The confirmation 
order was a final appealable order. See id.  at 469. We 
review the District Court's legal determinations de novo, its 
factual findings for clear error, and its exercise of discretion 
for abuse thereof. See In re Environmental Energy, Inc., 188 
F.3d 116, 122 (3d Cir. 1999). 
 
II. Equitable Mootness 
 
Under the doctrine of equitable mootness, an appeal 
should be dismissed, even if the court has jurisdiction and 
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could fashion relief, if the implementation of that relief 
would be inequitable. See In re Continental Airlines, 91 F.3d 
553, 559 (3d Cir. 1996) (Continental I). As we noted in 
Continental I, "[t]he use of the word`mootness' as a 
shortcut for a court's decision that the fait accompli of a 
plan confirmation should preclude further judicial 
proceedings has led to unfortunate confusion" between 
equitable mootness and constitutional mootness. Id. 
Constitutional mootness implicates the Article III case or 
controversy requirement; an appeal is moot in the 
constitutional sense only if events have taken place that 
make it "impossible for the court to grant `any effectual 
relief whatever.' " Church of Scientology of Calif. v. United 
States, 506 U.S. 9, 12 (1992) (citation omitted). Equitable 
mootness is a broader concept that has developed in 
bankruptcy law. It provides that that "[a]n appeal should 
. . . be dismissed as moot when, even though effective relief 
could conceivably be fashioned, implementation of that 
relief would be inequitable." Continental I , 91 F.3d at 558 
(citing In re Chateaugay Corp., 988 F.2d 322, 325 (2d Cir. 
1993)). 
 
In Continental I, we dismissed the appeal after finding it 
equitably moot because the appeal had an "integral nexus" 
with the feasibility of the Continental Debtors' plan of 
reorganization. Id. at 564. The Court identified prudential 
factors with which to evaluate equitable mootness, 
including whether the plan has been substantially 
consummated or stayed, whether the requested relief would 
affect the rights of other parties, whether the requested 
relief would affect the success of the plan, and whether it 
would further the public policy of affording finality to 
bankruptcy judgments. See id. at 560. These factors are 
given varying weight, depending on the particular 
circumstances, but the foremost consideration is whether 
the reorganization plan has been substantially 
consummated. See id. "This is especially so where the 
reorganization involves intricate transactions . . . or where 
outside investors have relied on the confirmation of the 
plan." Id. at 560-61 (citations omitted). We have also noted, 
however, that the doctrine is "limited in scope and [should 
be] cautiously applied," id. at 559, and that it involves "a 
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discretionary balancing of equitable and prudential factors," 
id. at 560. 
 
The Debtors here argue that, since the stay was denied 
and the reorganization has gone forward, this appeal is 
equitably moot. They argue that the appeal, if successful, 
would necessitate the reversal or unraveling of the entire 
plan of reorganization. We disagree. There are intermediate 
options. The releases (or some of the releases) could be 
stricken from the plan without undoing other portions of it. 
We draw instruction in this regard from In re Chateaugay 
Corp., 167 B.R. 776, 780 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), in which the 
court stated that 
 
       [i]t is difficult to conceive how a potential liability of, at 
       most, several million dollars could unravel the Debtors' 
       reorganization, which involved the transfer of billions of 
       dollars, and which has resulted in the revival of 
       Debtors into a multibillion dollar operation with $200 
       million in working capital . . . appellees have made no 
       showing that it would "knock the props out from under 
       the authorization for every transaction that has taken 
       place and create an unmanageable, uncontrollable 
       situation for the Bankruptcy Court." 
 
(quoting In re Chateaugay Corp., 10 F.3d 944, 952 (2d Cir. 
1993)). 
 
In balancing the policy favoring finality of bankruptcy 
court judgments--particularly reorganization plans-- 
against other considerations, we conclude that the equities 
here do not require dismissal. Huff has clearly been an 
active participant in the reorganization and was heard at 
length in the confirmation hearing, and in that sense has 
had its day in court. It seeks to invalidate releases that 
affect the rights and liabilities of third parties. The plan has 
been substantially consummated, but, as noted above, the 
plan could go forward even if the releases were struck, and 
Huff 's reply brief suggests that it now seeks only 
alterations to the plan rather than an unraveling of the 
reorganization. Cf. In re Continental Airlines , 203 F.3d 203, 
210 (3d Cir. 2000) (Continental II) (rejecting equitable 
mootness argument as inadequately pled, but noting also 
that the argument was unlikely to succeed because"[n]o 
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evidence or arguments have been presented that Plaintiffs' 
appeal, if successful, would necessitate the reversal or 
unraveling of the entire plan of reorganization"). We 
therefore hold that this appeal should not be dismissed for 
equitable mootness. 
 
III. The Absolute Priority Rule 
 
Section 1129(b)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code requires that 
creditors be paid in full before holders of equity receive any 
distribution. It reads in pertinent part: 
 
       (2) For the purpose of this subsection, the condition 
       that a plan be fair and equitable with respect to a class 
       includes the following requirements: 
 
       . . . 
 
       (b) With respect to a class of unsecured claims-- 
 
       . . . 
 
       (ii) the holder of any claim or interest that is junior to 
       the claims of such class will not receive or retain under 
       the plan on account of such junior claim or interest 
       any property. 
 
11 U.S.C. S 1129(b)(2). This provision is the"absolute 
priority rule." Huff contends that the District Court erred in 
confirming the plan because, by releasing the claims arising 
out of the recapitalization, the plan awarded an interest to 
old equity (KKR and the other participants in the 
reorganization) "on account of " their interest in the estate 
in violation of the absolute priority rule. Huff 's theory has 
several components. First, it makes the legal argument that 
under Bank of America National Trust and Savings 
Association v. 203 North LaSalle Street Partnership , 526 
U.S. 434 (1999), the Supreme Court's most recent case 
construing S 1129(b)(2), no junior class of creditors or 
interest holders may receive or retain any property under a 
plan in which a rejecting class of creditors is not being paid 
in full. Second, Huff submits that the District Court erred 
in concluding that the claims were eliminated because they 
were unlikely to succeed and potentially costly to the 
debtors to pursue. The success of this contention depends 
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on Huff 's ability to establish that the Examiner and the 
District Court erred in concluding that the claims were 





In 203 North LaSalle, 526 U.S. 434 (1999), the Supreme 
Court held that, even if it is assumed that there is a new 
value corollary to the absolute priority rule (which would 
allow old equity to contribute new value and receive interest 
in the reorganized entity in exchange), allowing junior 
interest holders to have an exclusive opportunity to obtain 
an interest in a reorganized entity by providing new value, 
free from competition and without market valuation, 
violates S 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii). See id. at 458.10 This is because 
the exclusive opportunity to invest in the reorganized entity 
(and receive equity in it thereby) must be considered 
property received "on account of " the junior claim (the 
equity interest). Id. Huff argues that the plan, by releasing 
the claims arising out of the leveraged recapitalization held 
by the bankrupt entity against holders of junior equity 
(such as KKR) even though senior creditors were not paid 
in full, essentially transferred property to those holders of 
junior equity in violation of the absolute priority rule. 
 
There can be little doubt that a legal claim is property 
within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Code. See Northview 
Motors, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 186 F.3d 346, 350 (3d 
Cir. 1999) (treating estate's legal claims as estate property 
within the meaning of the Code). Similarly, a release of 
liability has value cognizable under the Code. Accordingly, 
when the Debtors extinguished the claims arising out of the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. For some time, there has been a split of authority regarding whether 
there is a "new value" exception or corollary to the absolute priority 
rule. 
Such a corollary would mean that, when old equity provides new value 
under the reorganization plan, any property it receives under the plan 
would not be considered to be received "on account of " the old equity 
interest and therefore would not violate the absolute priority rule. The 
Supreme Court declined to decide whether there is a new value corollary 
in 203 North LaSalle, 526 U.S. at 454 (1999), and that issue is not 
presented in this case. 
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recapitalization, KKR received something of value even 
though some creditors senior to the equity holder had not 
been paid in full. KKR is a key potential object of the 
avoidance claims because it was a moving force in the 
reorganization, and a holder of equity in the Debtors. Thus, 
if KKR benefitted from the releases "on account of " its 
interest in the Debtors, then the plan violated the absolute 
priority rule. 
 
In 203 North LaSalle, the Supreme Court interpreted the 
"on account of " language in S 1129(B)(2)(b)(ii). The Court 
rejected arguments that "on account of " means "in 
satisfaction of " the interest or "in exchange for" the interest 
and concluded that it means "because of " the interest. 526 
U.S. at 450-51. Accordingly, a causal connection between 
holding the prior claim or interest, and receiving or 
retaining property, will trigger the absolute priority rule. 
The degree of causation required is not defined specifically 
in 203 North LaSalle, because the Court concluded that on 
either of several views the creditor's objection in that case 
would require rejection of the plan at issue. See id. at 454. 
Nevertheless, the Court provided a few points of reference 
for defining prohibited "on account of " transactions. 
 
First, the Court rejected the amicus curiae position of the 
United States, which had contended that, under a 
reorganization plan, old equity should not be allowed to 
take any property of the debtor if creditors are not paid in 
full. See id. at 451. The Court said that this "starchy" 
position could not be correct because, under this view of 
the absolute priority rule, Congress would have omitted 
entirely the phrase "on account of." Id.  at 451-52. This 
confirms that there are some cases in which property can 
transfer to junior interests not "on account of " those 
interests but for other reasons. 
 
Second, in considering the necessary level of causation, 
the Court looked to the two basic goals of Chapter 11: 
those of "preserving going concerns and maximizing 
property available to satisfy creditors." Id.  at 453. While 
emphasizing that it was not providing "an exhaustive list of 
the requirements," id., the Court explained: 
 
       Causation between the old equity's holdings and 
       subsequent property substantial enough to disqualify a 
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       plan would presumably occur on this view of things 
       whenever old equity's later property would come at a 
       price that failed to provide the greatest possible 
       addition to the bankruptcy estate, and it would always 
       come at a price too low when the equity holders 
       obtained or preserved an ownership interest for less 
       than someone else would have paid. 
 




We do not believe that these releases were made"on 
account of " KKR's junior interest as that phrase is 
construed in 203 North LaSalle. What doomed the plan in 
203 North LaSalle was not that old equity received property 
under the plan, but the "exclusivity" that old equity 
enjoyed, which suggested that old equity might have 
obtained the interest for less than someone else might have 
paid.11 Under the 203 North LaSalle plan, old equity set the 
price for the interest it obtained under the plan, and the 
right to set this price amounted to a property right in itself: 
 
       Hence it is that the exclusiveness of the opportunity 
       with its protection against the market's scrutiny of the 
       purchase price by means of competing bids or even 
       competing plan proposals, renders the partners' right a 
       property interest extended "on account of " the old 
       equity position and therefore subject to an unpaid 
       senior creditor class's objection. 
 
Id. at 456. 
 
In this case, to the extent that KKR and the other entities 
that benefitted from the releases had an exclusive 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. Huff argues that 203 North LaSalle's prohibition on exclusive 
opportunities was violated here because the Debtors had the exclusive 
opportunity to dispose of the Debtors' property. However, to read 203 
North LaSalle so broadly would be to undermine the express statutory 
provision for exclusivity in S 1121(b), which provides "[e]xcept as 
otherwise provided in this section, only the debtor may file a plan until 
after 120 days after the date of the order for relief under this chapter." 
See In re Zenith Electronics, 241 B.R. 92, 106 (Bankr. D. Del. 1999) 
(making this point). This we decline to do. 
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opportunity to gain the release in the reorganization, it was 
only because they were on the radar screen as potentially 
liable parties. Huff has adduced no evidence that they 
sought out the releases or set a price for them; indeed, Huff 
itself made several offers for the claims, which were 
considered and rejected, demonstrating that KKR enjoyed 
no exclusivity of opportunity.12 
 
The District Court held that the decision to extinguish 
the claims arising out of the recapitalization was made 
because the claims were adjudged to have a negative value 
to the estate and not because the junior creditors 
persuaded the Debtors to release them "on account of " 
their interest in the Debtors and in violation of the absolute 
priority rule. It concluded that the claims were extinguished 
for three reasons. First, it was persuaded by the Examiner's 
conclusion that there was a low likelihood of recovery on 
the claims. At the stay hearing, the Court noted that 
 
       I have to say I was sitting at the end of the 
       confirmation hearing, still waiting to hear the facts that 
       would convince me that there . . . was value to be had 
       . . . and I never heard that. And I remain convinced 
       that there was every opportunity to make that record, 
       and that record was not made. 
 
The Examiner concluded that the prospects for successfully 
prosecuting the claims were "not promising." He noted that, 
as a factual matter, the recapitalization transaction differed 
markedly from prior highly leveraged transactions that had 
been found to be unlawful insofar as the risks of the 
transaction were born by the acquirer (KKR) and other 
unsecured creditors and not by pre-transaction creditors. 
Second, the Court concluded that the potential cost to the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. Huff has argued that its own willingness to buy the claims from the 
bankruptcy estate shows that the claims did have value (and thus, by 
implication, that they were extinguished not because they lacked value 
but because they had value that the junior creditors saw and managed 
to capture in violation of the absolute priority rule). But Huff offered 
only 
$100,000 plus some portion of any future recovery. We do not think that 
relatively meager and arguably strategic offer demonstrates that the 
claims would have had more value to the estate if they had been 
preserved or sold to Huff than they did under the reorganization plan. 
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estate of prosecuting the action and defending and paying 
indemnification claims, cross claims, and counterclaims 
arising out of the prosecution was high. Third, the Court 
believed that there was some likelihood that the Banks and 
the subordinated noteholders, as participants in the 
leveraged recapitalization, would be estopped from 
recovering on the claims. 
 
Huff and HSBC do not challenge the Examiner's (and the 
District Court's) factual findings, which, at all events, are 
well supported, but contend that the Examiner's analysis of 
the value of the claims was flawed because he made a legal 
error in determining that a court would evaluate the claims 
on an enterprise evaluation basis, and thus he incorrectly 
concluded that the claims were unlikely to succeed. It is on 
this basis that they challenge the finding made by the 
Examiner and accepted by the District Court that the 
claims were of little value to the estate. Their theory is that 
the claims did have substantial value and thus that the 
District Court erred in concluding that the claims were 





The Examiner analyzed the viability of any claims arising 
out of the recapitalization primarily under Alabama law.13 
Two types of fraudulent transfers, actual and constructive, 
are within the scope of the Alabama Fraudulent Transfer 
Act, ALA. CODE 1975, S 8-9A-1 et seq. See McPherson Oil Co., 
Inc. v. Massey, 643 So.2d 595, 596 (Ala. 1994). An actual 
fraudulent transfer is one made by a debtor who transfers 
assets "with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any 
creditor of the debtor." ALA. CODE 1975, S 8-9A-4(a). The 
trial court considers several factors in determining whether 
the debtor possessed the requisite intent, including to 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
13. Huff does not challenge the decision to analyze claims arising out of 
the recapitalization under Alabama law. The Examiner canvassed choice 
of law rules and determined that Alabama law would apply to the claims 
whether suit was filed within the Third Circuit or in Alabama because 
Alabama's contacts with Bruno's generally, and with the recapitalization 
specifically, exceeded all others in quantity, substance, and 
significance. 
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whom the transfer was made, the amount of assets 
transferred, and the financial condition of the debtor before 
and after the transfer. See id., S8-9A-4(b); McPherson Oil, 
643 So.2d at 596. A constructive fraudulent transfer occurs 
when a debtor transfers assets to another without 
consideration, and the debtor was, or became, insolvent at 
the time of the transfer. See ALA. CODE 1975, S 8-9A-5(a); 
McPherson Oil, 643 So.2d at 596; Champion v. Locklear, 
523 So.2d 336, 338 (Ala. 1988). 
 
The parties have focused on potential constructive 
fraudulent transfer claims.14 To succeed on a claim of 
constructive fraudulent transfer arising out of the 
recapitalization, a claimant would have to show that 
Bruno's was insolvent or left with unreasonably small 
capital at the time of the recapitalization.15 Based on the 
conclusion that the leveraged recapitalization did not 
render Bruno's insolvent or leave it with unreasonably 
small capital, the Examiner concluded that the claims had 
little value.16 He noted as well that, because KKR bore most 
of the risk of the transaction, the chance that KKR would 
be held liable for constructive fraudulent transfer was 
remote. 
 
Huff would have us reject the Examiner's conclusions 
that Bruno's was solvent after the recapitalization on the 
basis that the Examiner used an incorrect method to 
evaluate solvency. Huff argues that the Examiner erred by 
evaluating solvency on a "business enterprise" method 
rather than a "piecemeal or asset-by-asset" valuation 
method (which does not take goodwill into account except 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
14. The Examiner concluded that the chances that a claim for actual 
fraudulent transfer would succeed were remote. 
 
15. The Examiner concluded that the fraudulent transfer claims would 
not be barred under the applicable statutes of limitations, and no one 
has challenged that conclusion. 
 
16. The Examiner also concluded that there was a reasonable possibility 
that the subordinated noteholders and the Banks would be estopped 
from sharing in any fraudulent transfer recoveries. In this regard, it is 
significant that 87% of the debtors' creditors (i.e. the senior lenders 
and 
the subordinated noteholders) participated in the recapitalization. 
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insofar as the entity includes separately saleable  
intangibles).17 
 
The Examiner used the business enterprise method, as 
opposed to the asset-by-asset method, after extensive 
analysis of the case law. He concluded that it was unlikely 
that a court would analyze fraudulent conveyance claims 
under the asset-by-asset test and that the business 
enterprise method was consistent with generally accepted 
accounting principles (GAAP) and appropriate under the 
circumstances. We conclude that the District Court's 
decision to credit the Examiner's Report, which concluded 
that the business enterprise approach was the appropriate 
measure of solvency, was not error. The Alabama 
Fraudulent Transfer Act does not appear to require an 
asset-by-asset approach.18 The statute limits the definition 
of assets without excluding assets, such as goodwill, that 
are typically included in the business enterprise analysis 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
17. The Examiner actually used an "adjusted business enterprise" 
method, in which he considered short-term liabilities, which are often 
left out of a business enterprise analysis. He did so because he 
concluded that a court analyzing fraudulent transfer would include short 
term liabilities in an assessment of liabilities. The Examiner also 
considered contingent and off-balance sheet liabilities for the same 
reason. 
 
18. The statute provides that 
 
       (a) A debtor is insolvent if the sum of the debtor's debts is 
greater 
       than all of the debtor's assets at a fair valuation. 
 
       (b) A debtor who is generally not paying his debts as they become 
       due is presumed to be insolvent. 
 
       *** 
 
       (d) Assets under this section do not include property that has been 
       transferred, concealed, or removed with intent to hinder, delay, or 
       defraud creditors or that has been transferred in a manner making 
       the transfer voidable under this chapter. 
 
       (e) Debts under this section do not include an obligation to the 
       extent it is secured by a valid lien on property of the debtor not 
       included as an asset. 
 
ALA. CODE 1975 S 8-9A-2. No evaluation method is specified by the 
statute, which does not define "fair valuation." 
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but not in an asset-by-asset evaluation. See ALA. CODE 1975 
S 8-9A-2. 
 
Moreover, however value is analyzed, it is clear that 
Bruno's functioned soundly for several years after the 
recapitalization, paying its debts (including all interest 
payments) and successfully renegotiating the interest rates 
on some of its loans. Huff has given us no reason to 
conclude that the Examiner incorrectly determined that 
Bruno's was solvent at the time of the recapitalization. Huff 
itself initially invested in Bruno's in December 1995 (four 
months after the recapitalization). It made additional 
investments in 1996 and early 1997, and in October 1997 
Huff 's analysts were still recommending Bruno's as a 
"buy." Importantly, and as the District Court noted, at the 
time of the recapitalization Huff 's own experts agreed that 
Bruno's was solvent: 
 
       The credit analysis prepared by Huff 's financial 
       analyst, Allen Gurevich, in August 1995 (Debtor's 
       Exhibit 18) and the testimony of Huff 's portfolio 
       manager (tr. pp 122-123) and Huff 's inside attorney 
       Bryan Bloom (tr. 166-0167) that the fair market value 
       of Bruno's at the time of the Leveraged Recapitalization 
       in August 1995 approximated 1.1 billion. 
 
And as the Examiner noted, "in connection with the 
transaction, other sophisticated financial inst[itutions] 
relied on KKR's projections. From interviews with 
representatives of all of these institutions and a review of 
thousands of documents, the Examiner is aware of no 
instance in which these institutions contemporaneously 
challenged the reasonableness of KKR's projections for 
Bruno's." Huff 's challenge to the Examiner's and the 
District Court's finding that the leveraged recapitalization 
did not render Bruno's insolvent is unavailing. 
 
As noted above, Huff does not challenge the Examiner's 
factual findings, and we find no error in District Court's 
decision to accept the Examiner's decision to evaluate the 
claims using the business enterprise method. Huff 's 
remaining argument that the release of the claims was on 
account of the interest amounts to an argument from res 
ipsa loquitur: KKR had an equity interest in the corporation, 
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and therefore the Debtors must have made the releases for 
that reason. If we were to accept this position, without 
some evidence of a causal relationship, any time that old 
equity received anything of value under a reorganization 
plan we would have to conclude that it was received"on 
account of " the interest--the position rejected by the 
Supreme Court in 203 North LaSalle. See  526 U.S. at 451- 
52. In this regard, it is significant that claims against all 
participants in the recapitalization, and not just KKR, were 
extinguished, including all claims against the noteholders 
(including Huff) and all claims against the shareholders 
who were bought out in the recapitalization (who were the 
managers of the company when it made the deal for the 
reorganization). 
 
The evidence compels the conclusion that the claims 
were extinguished because, in the judgment of the plan 
proponents, extinguishment was the approach most likely 
to provide the greatest possible addition to the bankruptcy 
estate. To be sure, the releases were not subjected to a 
formal "market test," as 203 North LaSalle  suggests may be 
required. However, in these circumstances, the Examiner's 
finding that the claims had little to no value, which was 
accepted by the District Court, was an appropriate 
surrogate for a market test and an acceptable safeguard. 
 
We thus conclude that the District Court did not err in 
concluding that the potential cost of defending and paying 
indemnification claims, cross claims, and counterclaims 
arising out of the prosecution of the claims was high, and 
that the claims were extinguished not on account of KKR's 
interest in the Debtors, but because the Debtors 
determined that they were unlikely to have any value. The 
Examiner's and the District Court's conclusions that the 
claims were unlikely to succeed and were potentially costly 
to pursue are legally and factually supported. Huff has 
failed to demonstrate the requisite causal relationship 
between the transfer of value and KKR's interest in the 
Debtors. Therefore, we conclude that the plan did not 
violate the absolute priority rule. 
 
This is not to say that a reorganization plan can transfer 
assets whenever the Trustee or the Debtor-in-Possession 
judges that to do so would be in the best interest of the 
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reorganized entity. Rather, we announce a narrow rule that, 
without direct evidence of causation, releasing potential 
claims against junior equity does not violate the absolute 
priority rule in the particular circumstance in which the 
estate's claims are of only marginal viability and could be 
costly for the reorganized entity to pursue. 
 
IV. Good Faith 
 
Huff contends that the plan should not have been 
confirmed because the District Court erred in determining 
that it was proposed in good faith. Section 1129(a)(3) 
provides that the court shall confirm a plan only if "[t]he 
plan has been proposed in good faith and not by any means 
forbidden by law." 11 U.S.C. S 1129(a)(3)."[F]or purposes of 
determining good faith under section 1129(a)(3) . . . the 
important point of inquiry is the plan itself and whether 
such a plan will fairly achieve a result consistent with the 
objectives and purposes of the Bankruptcy Code." In re 
Abbotts Dairies of Pennsylvania, Inc., 788 F.2d 143, 150 n.5 
(3d Cir. 1986) (quoting In re Madison Hotel Assocs., 749 
F.2d 410, 425 (7th Cir. 1984)) (alteration in original). The 
District Court's determinations of fact pertaining to good 
faith are reviewed for clear error. Cf. Abbotts Dairies, 788 
F.2d at 147 (holding that the standard of review for good 
faith under S 363(m) of the Code is mixed:"we exercise 
plenary review of the legal standard applied by the district 
and bankruptcy courts, but review the latter court's 
findings of fact on a clearly erroneous standard") (citations 
omitted). 
 
Huff contends that the plan was not proposed in good 
faith because the releases from any claims arising out of 
the recapitalization were made in a collusive quid pro quo 
for the waiver of preferences. Huff 's theory of bad faith is 
that KKR orchestrated the reorganization and controlled the 
Debtors throughout the reorganization in order to avoid 
potential liability arising out of the leveraged 
recapitalization, and that it persuaded the other creditors to 
agree to the reorganization plan by including the waiver of 
preferences. 
 
As the District Court found, however, the timing of the 
releases belies this argument; there is scant evidence tying 
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the release of the claims arising out of the recapitalization 
to the waiver of preferences. The Debtors decided not to 
pursue the preferences on March 17, 1999. One month 
later, the Committee passed a resolution preserving the 
claims arising out of the recapitalization until further 
information could be gathered about them. This shows that 
a month after the Debtors decided not to pursue the 
preferences, the Committee had not decided whether to 
release the claims arising out of the recapitalization plans. 
 
At the confirmation hearing, Ms. Schirmang, co-chair of 
the Committee, testified that the Debtors did not release 
the claims arising out of the leveraged recapitalization in a 
quid pro quo deal for the preference claims. She testified 
that, when the Committee decided to release the claims in 
May 1999, it did so "in the interest of getting the plan into 
the hands of creditors and hopefully getting a distribution 
as soon as possible and getting the Debtor out of 
bankruptcy." Ms. Schirmang also testified that the 
preference waivers were intended to maintain and 
rehabilitate post-petition relationships within the trade, and 
that there was nothing unusual about the waiver of 
preferences: "to be honest with you, I have never seen a 
reorganized debtor pursuing preference actions." The trade 
creditors who benefitted from the waivers included key 
suppliers to the business. See note 3, supra. Huff has not 
presented anything but innuendo in support of its 
argument that the Debtors failed to act in good faith. Given 
the record evidence, we conclude that the District Court's 
finding that the plan was proposed in good faith was not in 
error. 
 
V. Conformity to Applicable Provision of 
       Title II of the Code 
 
Section 1129(a)(1) provides that the court shall confirm a 
plan if it "complies with the applicable provisions of this 
title." 11 U.S.C. S 1129(a)(1). This requires that the plan 
conform to the applicable provisions of Title II. See 
Lawrence P. King, Collier on BankruptcyP 1129.03[1], 1129- 
25 (15th ed. rev. 1996). Huff argues that the plan should 
not have been confirmed because it violates several 
provisions of Title II. 
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A. Section 510(a) 
 
Section 510(a) provides that a "subordination agreement 
is enforceable in a case under this title to the same extent 
that such agreement is enforceable under applicable 
nonbankruptcy law." Huff argues that it had subrogation 
rights under the indenture which are violated by the terms 
of the plan. The relevant provision of the indenture provides 
that 
 
       [a]fter all senior indebtedness has been paid in full 
       . . . . Holders shall be subrogated . . . to the rights of 
       holder of Senior Indebtedness to receive distributions 
       [from the debtors] applicable to Senior Indebtedness to 
       the extent that distributions otherwise payable to the 
       Holders have been applied to the payment of Senior 
       Indebtedness. No payments or distributions to the 
       holders of Senior Indebtedness to which the Holders of 
       the Securities or the Trustee would be entitled except 
       for the provisions of this Article . . . shall, as between 
       the Company, its creditors other than holders of the 
       Senior Indebtedness and the Holders of the Securities, 
       be deemed to be a payment by the Company to or on 
       account of Senior Indebtedness. 
 
The subordination agreement is an intercreditor 
arrangement between the Banks (the senior indebtedness) 
and the subordinated noteholders. It does not relieve the 
Debtors of their payment obligations on the subordinated 
notes. But the subordinated noteholders' subrogation rights 
under the indenture described in these provisions never 
arose because the Banks' claims were not paid in full under 
the plan. There is no question that the Banks were not paid 
in full under the reorganization plan, because the 
reorganized entity was worth at most $340 million, whereas 
the Banks had claims of $421 million. 
 
Huff argues that the subordinated noteholders had a 
right under this provision to subrogation. More specifically, 
Huff argues that it should be awarded warrants to 
purchase common stock if and when the reorganized 
company reaches a value of $421 million. But the 
bankruptcy estate is evaluated and distributions made at 
the time of the effective date of the reorganization plan. See 
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11 U.S.C. S 1129(b)(2)(B)(i) (referring to"value, as of the 
effective date of the plan"). After that date, there are no 
remaining claims under which Huff could assert 
subrogation rights. This contention therefore fails. 
 
Huff also argues that under an additional clause, the so- 
called X clause, the subordinated noteholders should get 
securities in the new entity subordinated to the Banks' 
interests to the same extent that they had an interest in the 
old entity.19 The clause states that 
 
       [u]ntil all Obligations with respect to Senior 
       Indebtedness (as provided in Subsection above) are 
       paid in full in cash or cash equivalent, any distribution 
       to which holders would be entitled but for this article 
       shall be made to holders of Senior Indebtedness (except 
       that Holder may receive (i) securities that are 
       subordinated to at least the same extent as the 
       Securities to (a) Senior Indebtedness and (b) any 
       securities issue in exchange for Senior Indebtedness), 
       as their interests may appear. 
 
This clause does not apply to the current situation. The 
clause requires that, if the Debtors distribute securities to 
the subordinated noteholders, the general obligation to turn 
over distributions to Senior Indebtedness is waived so long 
as the new securities are subordinated "to the same extent 
as" the existing subordinated debt. 
 
As the Seventh Circuit has explained, these clauses are 
quite common, and are intended to avoid a procedure of 
requiring junior creditors to turn over securities and then 
receive them back once senior creditors are paid in full: 
 
       [s]uch clauses are common in bond debentures, 
       although there is no standard wording. Without the 
       clause, the subordination agreement that it qualifies 
       would require the junior creditors to turn over to the 
       senior creditors any securities that they had received 
       as a distribution in the reorganization, unless the 
       senior creditors had been paid in full. Then, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
19. The Debtors argue that this issue was not raised in the District 
Court, but we are satisfied that it was raised in HSBC's objections to the 
plan, and in Huff 's argument to the District Court. 
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       presumably, if the senior creditors obtained full 
       payment by liquidating some of the securities that had 
       been turned over, the remaining securities would be 
       turned back over to the junior creditors. The X Clause 
       shortcuts this cumbersome procedure and enhances 
       the marketability of the securities received by the 
       junior creditors, since their right to possess (as distinct 
       from pocket the proceeds of) the securities is 
       uninterrupted. 
 
In the Matter of Envirodyne Indus., Inc., 29 F.3d 301, 306 
(7th Cir. 1994). We agree. The clause is not a requirement 
that the Debtors distribute to the subordinated noteholders 
subordinated securities, or warrants to purchase securities, 
if the reorganized entity does well in the future so that the 
Banks (the Senior Indebtedness) make back their losses, in 
proportion to any securities distributed to Senior 
Indebtedness. 
 
Huff makes one final argument under this section--that 
the provision of the indenture that states that"nothing in 
the indenture shall impair, as between the Company and 
the holders, the obligation of the Company, which is 
absolute and unconditional, to pay principal of and interest 
on the Securities in accordance with their terms," requires 
the Debtors to preserve a recovery for the noteholders with 
the issuance of securities junior to the common stock. This 
is a misreading of the provision, which simply provides that 
the subordination agreement is an intercreditor 
arrangement, i.e., an arrangement between the Banks (the 
senior indebtedness) and the subordinated noteholders, 
and does not relieve the Debtors of their payment 
obligations on the subordinated notes. 
 
B. Section 524(e) 
 
Section 524(e) provides that "[e]xcept as provided in 
subsection (a)(3) of this section,[20 ] discharge of a debt of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
20. Subsection (a)(3) provides that a discharge of a case under Title II 
 
       operates as an injunction against the commencement or 
       continuation of an action, the employment of process, or an act, to 
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the debtor does not affect the liability of any other entity 
on, or the property of any other entity for, such debt." 11 
U.S.C. S 524(e). Huff argues that the release in Paragraph 
58 of the confirmation order violates S 524(e), because it 
affects the liability of the members of the Committee and 
professionals who provided services to the Debtors to third 
parties. However, we believe that Paragraph 58, which is 
apparently a commonplace provision in Chapter 11 plans, 
does not affect the liability of these parties, but rather 
states the standard of liability under the Code, and thus 
does not come within the meaning of 524(e).21 
 
Section 524(e) "makes clear that the bankruptcy 
discharge of the debtor, by itself, does not operate to relieve 
non-debtors of their liabilities." In re Continental Airlines, 
203 F.3d 203, 211 (3d Cir. 2000) (Continental II ) (citations 
omitted). Section 524(e), by its terms, only provides that a 
discharge of the debtor does not affect the liability of non- 
debtors on claims by third parties against them for the debt 
discharged in bankruptcy. Thus, for example, S 524(e) 
makes clear that a discharge in bankruptcy does not 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       collect or recover from, or offset against, property of the debtor 
of 
       the kind specified in section 541(a)(2) of this title that is 
acquired 
       after the commencement of the case, on account of any allowable 
       community claim, except a community claim that is excepted from 
       discharge under section 523, 1228(a)(1), or 1328(c)(1) of this 
title, or 
       that would be so excepted, determined in accordance with the 
       provisions of sections 523(c) and 523(d) of this title, in a case 
       concerning the debtor's spouse commenced on the date of the filing 
       of the petition in the case concerning the debtor, whether or not 
       discharge of the debt based on such community claim is waived. 
 
11 U.S.C. 524(a)(3). 
 
21. HSBC argues more generally that "[t]he most obvious defect of the 
Plan is that it incorporates releases and provides for extinction of 
causes 
of action against non debtor third parties for no consideration." It 
argues 
that under In re Continental Airlines, 203 F.3d 203, 211 (3d Cir. 2000), 
a plan with releases is unconfirmable as a matter of law. HSBC reads 
S 524(e) and Continental II too broadly. Section 524(e) provides that the 
bankruptcy discharge of the debtor does not operate to relieve non- 
debtors of their liabilities, but by its terms it does not govern 
provisions 
in a plan by which a debtor releases its own claims against third parties. 
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extinguish claims by third parties against guarantors or 
directors and officers of the debtor for the debt discharged 
in bankruptcy. Indeed, Continental II held that a plan that 
enjoined plaintiffs' actions against the debtor's directors 
and officers who "ha[d] not formally availed themselves of 
the benefits and burdens of the bankruptcy process," id. at 
211, violated S 524(e), id. at 214. The injunction in that 
plan protected directors and officers from actions taken 
prior to bankruptcy that allegedly violated the securities 
laws and thus abrogated the liability of third parties. 
 
Paragraph 58 does not similarly affect the liability of 
third parties. Paragraph 58 provides that 
 
       [n]one of the Debtors, the Reorganized Debtors, New 
       Bruno's, the Creditor Representative, the Committee or 
       any of their respective members, officers, directors, 
       employees, advisors, professionals or agents shall have 
       or incur any liability to any holder of a Claim or Equity 
       Interest for any act or omission in connection with, 
       related to, or arising out of, the Chapter 11 Cases, the 
       pursuit of confirmation of the Plan, the consummation 
       of the Plan or the Administration of the Plan or the 
       property to be distributed under the Plan, except for 
       willful misconduct or gross negligence, and, in all 
       respects, the Debtors, the Reorganized Debtors, New 
       Bruno's, the Creditor Representative, the Committee 
       and each of their respective members, officers, 
       directors, employees, advisors, professionals and 
       agents shall be entitled to rely upon the advice of 
       counsel with respect to their duties and responsibilities 
       under the plan. 
 
Under Paragraph 58, members of the Committee and 
professionals who provided services to the Debtors remain 
liable for willful misconduct or gross negligence. Because 
we conclude that this standard of liability is the standard 
that already applies in this situation, we believe that 
Paragraph 58 affects no change in liability. 
 
Section 1103(c) of the Bankruptcy Code, which grants to 
the Committee broad authority to formulate a plan and 
perform "such other services as are in the interest of those 
represented," 11 U.S.C. S 1103(c), has been interpreted to 
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imply both a fiduciary duty to committee constituents and 
a limited grant of immunity to committee members, see In 
re L.F. Rothschild Holdings, Inc., 163 B.R. 45, 49 (S.D.N.Y. 
1994); In re Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, Inc. , 138 B.R. 
717, 722 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992), aff 'd, 140 B.R. 347 
(S.D.N.Y. 1992); In re Tucker Freight Lines, Inc., 62 B.R. 
213, 216, 218 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1986); Lawrence P. King, 
Collier on Bankruptcy P 1103.05[4], 1103-32-33 (15th ed. 
rev. 1996) ("[A]ctions against committee members in their 
capacity as such should be discouraged. If members of the 
committee can be sued by persons unhappy with the 
committee's performance during the case or unhappy with 
the outcome of the case, it will be extremely difficult to find 
members to serve on an official committee."). 
 
This immunity covers committee members for actions 
within the scope of their duties. The committee members 
and the debtor are entitled to retain professional services to 
assist in the reorganization. In Pan Am Corp. v. Delta 
Airlines, Inc., 175 B.R. 438, 514 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), it was held 
that committee members and those professionals who 
provide services to the debtor with respect to 
reorganization, or to the committee members in their 
capacity as committee members, however, do remain liable 
for willful misconduct or ultra vires acts. 
 
We agree with this interpretation of S 1103(c) and hold 
that it limits liability of a committee to willful misconduct 
or ultra vires acts. The release in Paragraph 58 sets forth 
the appropriate standard for liability that would apply to 
actions against the committee members and the entities 
that provided services to the Committee in the event that 
they were sued for their participation in the reorganization.22 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
22. Huff also argues that the failure of the Debtors to enforce the 
subordinated noteholders' subrogation rights violates S 524(e) and calls 
this a provision "extinguish[ing] the Noteholders' rights to seek 
recoveries 
directly against the Banks," which constitutes an impermissible non- 
consensual third-party release. However, this argument is specious for 
the same reason that Huff 's main argument about the surbordination 
agreement is specious: the subordinated noteholders' subrogation rights 
only arise when the senior lenders are paid in full. As noted above, the 
senior creditors in this case were not paid in full under the plan. 
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It does not affect the liability of another entity on a debt of 
the debtor within the meaning of S 524(e). 
 
Nothing in our recent opinion in Continental II  is to the 
contrary. In that case, we held that a plan that enjoined 
plaintiffs' actions against Continental's directors and 
officers violated S 524(e). Id. at 214. The release in question 
here differs from that in Continental II in a fundamental 
way: it sets forth the applicable standard of liability under 
S 1103(c) rather than eliminating it altogether. In 
Continental II, we concluded that it was clear under any 
rule that the court might adopt that the releases at issue 
were impermissible because "the hallmarks of permissible 
non-consensual releases--fairness, necessity to the 
reorganization, and specific factual findings to support 
these conclusions--are all absent here." Id. at 214. We did 
not treat S 524(e) as a per se rule barring any provision in 
a reorganization plan limiting the liability of third parties. 
See id. Because of the differences between the releases in 
the two cases, Continental II does not compel the 
conclusion that this release is impermissible. Indeed, 
because this release does not affect the liability of third 
parties, but rather sets forth the appropriate standard of 
liability, we believe that this release is outside the scope of 
S 524(e). 
 
C. Sections 363 and 1123 
 
Section 363 governs the sale of assets outside of the 
reorganization plan. It permits the trustee (or the debtor-in- 
possession), after notice and a hearing, to use, sell, or lease 
property of the estate outside of the ordinary course of 
business. See 11 U.S.C. S 363(b)(1); In re Rickel Home 
Centers, 209 F.3d 291, 297 (3d Cir. 2000). Section 
1123(b)(4) provides that a plan may "provide for the sale of 
all or substantially all of the property of the estate, and the 
distribution of the proceeds of such sale among holders of 
claims or interests." 11 U.S.C. S 1123(b)(4). Huff 
characterizes the reorganization plan as involving a sale of 
assets and tries to transform these two sections of the 
Bankruptcy Code into a general duty to fully market the 
company, similar to the duty recognized by the Delaware 
Supreme Court in the context of corporate change in 
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control transactions. See Paramount Communications v. 
QVC Network, 637 A.2d 34, 43 (Del. 1994); Revlon, Inc. v. 
MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 
1986). 
 
This argument fails because these provisions of the Code, 
even if they do impose a duty to fully market assets in 
some circumstances (a question we do not address), are 
simply inapplicable to this situation. The plan wiped out 
old equity and issued new stock to the creditors. For tax 
purposes, this transaction was accomplished by 
transferring substantially all of the assets of the Debtors to 
a creditors' representative and immediately thereafter to the 
newly created Bruno's Supermarkets, a corporation whose 
equity is owned by the senior lenders. But just because a 
transaction is a sale or exchange for tax purposes does not 
mean that it is a sale within the meaning of the Code. See 
In re PCH Assocs., 804 F.2d 193, 201 (2d Cir. 1986) 
(looking to the economic substance of the transaction to 
determine whether it was a sale or a lease within the 
meaning of the Code). In a similar case, Major's Furniture 
Mart, Inc. v. Castle Credit Corp., 602 F.2d 538, 546 (3d Cir. 
1979), we stated that 
 
       [i]t is apparent to us that on this record none of the 
       risks present in a true sale is present here. Nor has the 
       custom of the parties or their relationship, as found by 
       the district court, given rise to more than a 
       debtor/creditor relationship in which Major's' debt was 
       secured by a transfer of Major's' customer accounts to 
       Castle . . . . Accordingly, we hold that on this record 
       the district court did not err in determining that the 
       true nature of the transaction between Major's and 
       Castle was a secured loan, not a sale. 
 
That the assets passed though the hands of a creditors' 
representative before being returned to the reorganized 
Debtors does not transform this plan from a stand-alone, 
internally generated plan of reorganization to a sale of 
assets to a third party. To hold otherwise would be to read 
S 1129 of the Code as characterizing the many 
reorganizations involving the transfer of control from a 
corporation's old equity to its creditors as involving a sale, 
a position without support in our jurisprudence. 
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D. Section 1129(a)(2) 
 
Section 1129(a)(2) provides that the court shall confirm a 
plan only if "[t]he proponent of the plan complies with the 
applicable provisions of this Title." 11 U.S.C.S 1129(a)(2). 
We agree with the District Court's conclusion that 
S 1129(a)(2) requires that the plan proponent comply with 
the adequate disclosure requirements of S 1125.23 Title 11 
U.S.C. S 1125(b) mandates the filing of a disclosure 
statement containing "adequate information." Huff argues 
that the plan proponents failed to comply with the 
disclosure requirements by failing to provide adequate 
information regarding the release of the preferences. The 
Debtors respond that Huff does not have standing to raise 
this argument. 
 
Appellate standing in bankruptcy cases is more limited 
than standing under Article III or the prudential 
requirements associated therewith. "Generally, litigants in 
federal court are barred from asserting the constitutional 
rights of others." Kane v. Johns-Manville Corp., 843 F.2d 
636, 643 (2d Cir. 1988) (citing Warth v. Seldin , 422 U.S. 
490, 499, 509 (1975)). The court in Kane explained why 
limits on third-party standing are particularly relevant to 
appellate standing in bankruptcy proceedings: 
 
       Bankruptcy proceedings regularly involve numerous 
       parties, each of whom might find it personally 
       expedient to assert the rights of another party even 
       though that other party is present in the proceedings 
       and is capable of representing himself. Third-party 
       standing is of special concern in the bankruptcy 
       context where, as here, one constituency before the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
23. Other courts also have found S 1125 to be one of the applicable 
provisions of the Code referenced to in S 1129. See, e.g., Tenn-Fla 
Partners v. First Union Nat'l Bank of Fla., 229 B.R. 720, 732 (W.D. Tenn. 
1999); In re Trans World Airlines, Inc., 185 B.R. 302, 313 (Bankr. 
E.D.Mo. 1995) ("The principal purpose of section 1129(a)(2) of the 
Bankruptcy Code is to assure that the plan proponents have complied 
with the disclosure requirements of section 1125 of the Bankruptcy Code 
in connection with the solicitation of acceptances of the plan."); see 
also 
Lawrence P. King, Collier on BankruptcyP 1129.03[2] at 1126-26.1 & 
n.14 (15th ed. rev. 1996). 
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       court seeks to disturb a plan of reorganization based 
       on the rights of third parties who apparently favor the 
       plan. In this context, the courts have been 
       understandably skeptical of the litigant's motives and 
       have often denied standing as to any claim that asserts 
       only third-party rights. 
 
Id. at 644; see also Travelers Ins. Co. v. H.K. Porter Co., 
Inc., 45 F.3d 737, 741 (3d Cir. 1995) (adopting the 
reasoning of Kane). 
 
Title 11 U.S.C. S 1109(b)--which provides that "[a] party 
in interest, including the debtor, the trustee, a creditors' 
committee, an equity security holders' committee, a 
creditor, an equity security holder, or any indenture 
trustee, may raise and may appear and be heard on any 
issue in a case under this chapter"--confers broad standing 
at the trial level. However, courts do not extend that 
provision to appellate standing: 
 
       This rule of appellate standing is derived from former 
       section 39(c) of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, which 
       permitted only a "person aggrieved" to appeal an order 
       of the bankruptcy court. 11 U.S.C. S 67(c) (1976) 
       (repealed 1978). Although the present Bankruptcy 
       Code does not contain any express restrictions on 
       appellate standing, courts have uniformly held that the 
       "person aggrieved" standard is applicable to cases 
       under the Code. 
 
Kane, 843 F.2d at 641-42. 
 
This court has emphasized that appellate standing in 
bankruptcy cases is limited to "person[s] aggrieved." 
Travelers Ins. Co., 45 F.3d at 741. We consider a person to 
be aggrieved only if the bankruptcy court's order 
"diminishes their property, increases their burdens, or 
impairs their rights." In re Dykes, 10 F.3d 184, 187 (3d Cir. 
1993) (citation omitted). Thus, only those "whose rights or 
interests are directly and adversely affected pecuniarily" by 
an order of the bankruptcy court may bring an appeal. Id. 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The 
"person aggrieved" standard is more stringent than the 
constitutional test for standing. In re O'Brien Envtl. Energy, 
Inc., 181 F.3d 527, 530 (3d Cir. 1999). 
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Huff contends that Bruno's failed to disclose that it had 
not done a thorough analysis of preference claims before 
deciding not to pursue them. But Huff itself was aware of 
this alleged failing at the time and pointed it out to the 
other creditors when it opposed the plan. Huff clearly would 
not have acted any differently if the disclosure had been 
made as it now argues it should have been. Similarly, 
because Huff pointed out the alleged failure to disclose in 
its statements protesting the plan, it cannot show that it 
was personally aggrieved because other creditors might 
have voted differently if they had had the information 
allegedly missing from the disclosure. Since Huff cannot 
show that it was personally aggrieved by any failure to 
disclose, we conclude that Huff does not have standing to 
raise this claim. See In re Middle Plantation of Williamsburg, 
Inc., 47 B.R. 884, 891 (E.D. Va. 1984) ("Holders of impaired 
claims who have been induced to vote in favor of a plan are 
the only ones who may raise the issue of the adequacy of 
the Disclosure Statement."), aff 'd, 755 F.2d 928 (4th Cir. 
1985). 
 
We do not foreclose the possibility that, in another case, 
a creditor objecting to a plan for lack of disclosure that 
actually had the information it complains is missing from 
the disclosure might nevertheless have standing if it could 
show that there is a possibility that other creditors would 
have acted differently (thus benefitting the protesting 
creditor) if they had had the same information. See In re 
Perez, 30 F.3d 1209, 1217 (9th Cir. 1994) (concluding that 
a creditor had standing on this theory). But in this case, 
because Huff itself made the information available to the 
other creditors, it has not made such a showing. The 
chance that the other creditors would have acted differently 
is simply too speculative to be a basis for third party 
standing here. 
 
E. Section 1129(a)(7) 
 
Section 1129(a)(7) provides that a court shall confirm a 
plan only if 
 
       With respect to each impaired class of claims or 
       interests-- 
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       (A) each holder of a claim or interest of such class-- 
 
       (i) has accepted the plan; or 
 
       (ii) will receive or retain under the plan on account of 
       such claim or interest property of a value, as of the 
       effective date of the plan, that is not less than the 
       amount that such holder would so receive or retain 
       if the debtor were liquidated under chapter 7 of this 
       title on such date; or 
 
       (B) if section 1111(b)(2) of this title applies to the 
       claims of such class, each holder of a claim of such 
       class will receive or retain under the plan on account 
       of such claim property of a value, as of the effective 
       date of the plan, that is not less than the value of such 
       holder's interest in the estate's interest in the property 
       that secures such claims. 
 
11 U.S.C. S 1129(a)(7). The District Court found that the 
Debtors have demonstrated at the Confirmation Hearing 
that creditors rejecting the plan would not receive a greater 
recovery in a Chapter 7 liquidation. We review this factual 
finding for clear error. 
 
Huff failed to challenge the Debtors' liquidation analysis. 
Huff also did not introduce evidence to demonstrate that 
the recapitalization claims have significant value or that it 
was in the best interests of the estate to pursue the 
preference claims. And as noted above, the Examiner's 
District Court findings to the contrary are well supported. 
Accordingly, the District Court did not commit clear error in 





For the foregoing reasons, the Order of the District Court 
confirming the Debtor's Second Amended Joint Plan of 
Reorganization under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code 
will be affirmed. 
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